

Bell's inequalities detect efficient entanglement

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Abstract

We review the status of Bell's inequalities in quantum information, stressing mainly the links with quantum key distribution and distillation of entanglement. We also prove that for all the eavesdropping attacks using one qubit, and for a family of attacks of two qubits, acting on half of a maximally entangled state of two qubits, the violation of a Bell inequality implies the possibility of an efficient secret-key extraction.

1 Introduction

Quantum correlations were noticed to be astonishing by Einstein-Podolski-Rosen [1] and by Schrödinger [2] back in 1935. In particular, the EPR paper stressed that the predicted correlations could not be explained by exchange of a signal, since the entangled particles could be at an arbitrary distance from one another. If signal exchange is excluded, in the classical world we know only another mechanism to establish correlations: common preparation at the source. This second possibility was ruled out by John Bell in 1964 [3]: the predicted quantum correlations violate a condition ("Bell's inequality", BI) that should hold if the correlations were established at the preparation. All the experiments performed since the Aspect experiment [4] in 1982 confirm quantum physics.

Nowadays, although one should not forget the detection and locality loophole until their joint experimental test [5], for most physicists the debate on quantum correlations is closed: *entanglement does exist*, and moreover it has been recognized as a *resource* needed to perform tasks that would be classically impossible [6]. While nobody doubts that the interpretational content of the BI should shape any physicist's view of the world, it is not clear whether BI can be of interest for quantum information processing. We have investigated this question, since we believe that deep concepts and clever applications should not become two separate domains.

This paper contains two separate sections: in section 2, we review the status of the Bell's inequalities in quantum information; in section 3, we present a

generalization of the link [7] between violation of Bell's inequalities and security of the quantum key distribution with qubits.

2 The status of Bell's inequalities in quantum information

2.1 BI and quantum cryptography

The goal of quantum cryptography (quantum key distribution, QKD) is to provide Alice and Bob with a secret key. An important result of classical cryptography says that if

$$I(A : B) > \min[I(A : E), I(B : E)] \quad (1)$$

where $I(X : Y)$ is the mutual information between X and Y , then a secret key can be extracted from the classical data (obtained by measuring the quantum systems) by efficient protocols using only one-way communication [8]. If that condition does not hold, in some cases a secret key can still be extracted, but all the known protocols are very inefficient.

Consider QKD with entangled particles [9], and let us start with the standard setting with two partners. Alice prepares the maximally entangled state, keeps one particle and sends the other one to Bob. In the absence of any spy on the line, whenever Alice and Bob measure in the same basis they obtain perfectly correlated random results. If the eavesdropper Eve has her own particles interact with the particle flying to Bob, the quantum state $|\Psi_{ABE}\rangle$ becomes shared among the three actors, and the quantum information shared by Alice and Bob is given by the mixed state ρ_{AB} obtained by tracing out Eve's system. The connection with BI is as follows: in all the studied protocols, considering Eve's optimal *individual* attack, if ρ_{AB} violates a Bell's inequality, then (1) holds.

This link was first noticed for the four-state protocol with qubits [7], in which case actually the violation of the CHSH inequality is also a necessary condition for (1) to hold. In section 3 we generalize this result. Protocols using higher-dimensional systems and/or more bases have also been studied, and in all these cases the condition seems only to be sufficient [10].

A different extension has also been studied: the extension to protocols involving more than two partners. In such "quantum secret-sharing" protocols, Alice distributes random bits to N Bobs, that must cooperate in order to retrieve the key. For protocols using qubits and two conjugated bases, it was also found [11] that a condition similar to (1) holds if and only if the Mermin-Klyshko inequalities are violated.

2.2 BI and distillation of entanglement

Distillation of entanglement is a fundamental quantum information process. The entanglement of a quantum state ρ is distillable if, out of many copies of it, one can extract maximally entangled states (two-qubit singlets) using

only local operations and classical communication (LOCC). Operationally, this means the following: if a source S produces a state which is weakly entangled but distillable, then one can build a new source S' , that is less efficient but produces strongly entangled states, by simply appending local devices to the ports of S and allowing the partners to communicate. In other words, if we have S , then we can build S' and run any quantum information protocol like teleportation. The notion of distillability is not trivial because, in all quantum composed systems but $\mathbb{C}^2 \otimes \mathbb{C}^2$ and $\mathbb{C}^2 \otimes \mathbb{C}^3$, there exist so-called bound-entangled states, that are entangled but not distillable.

We studied the link with BI in quantum systems composed of $N > 2$ qubits. In such a case, when the system is composed of more than two sub-systems, the notion of distillability is not even univoque. The strongest requirement is “full distillability”: any two partners can distill a singlet by LOCC. The weakest requirement is “bipartite distillability”: the N partners split into two groups of n_A and $n_B = N - n_A$ partners, and the state is distillable with respect to this partition n_A/n_B . Within each group, the most general transformations are allowed; but only classical communication is allowed between one group and the other.

We have demonstrated [12] a quantitative link between this hierarchy or *degree of distillability* and the amount of violation of the WWZB inequalities [13], that are the linear correlation inequalities with two settings per site. If a N -qubit state violates a WWZB inequality there is some distillable entanglement in the state; moreover, the amount of the violation is associated to the degree of distillability. In particular, a violation close to the maximal value, namely $\langle B_N \rangle \in]2^{(N-2)/2}, 2^{(N-1)/2}]$, guarantees full distillability of the state. A similar result holds for the Uffink inequality [14].

2.3 BI and communication complexity

A “communication complexity” problem is the problem of computing a function whose inputs are distributed among several partners, who can exchange only a limited amount of information. In the quantum version of such protocols, some of the input information is replaced by quantum information, and the partners can share an entangled state.

It has been shown in Ref. [15] that for every Bell’s inequality and for a broad class of protocols, there always exists a multi-partite communication complexity problem, for which the protocol assisted by states which violate the inequality is more efficient than any classical protocol. Moreover, for that advantage, the violation of the BI is a necessary and sufficient criterion.

3 CHSH and quantum key distribution with qubits

In this section we will show the link between Bell violation and the security of QKD protocols for all one-qubit eavesdropping attacks and a family of two-qubit attacks.

Consider the situation in which Alice locally prepares a maximally entangled state of two qubits, $|\Phi^+\rangle = (|00\rangle + |11\rangle)/\sqrt{2}$, and sends one of the qubits to Bob by an insecure quantum channel. This qubit is intercepted by Eve, who performs the following attack: (i) she adds a *one-qubit* ancillary system in the state $|E\rangle$ and performs a unitary operation, U_{BE} , over the two qubits and (ii) forwards one of the output qubits to Bob. Giving Eve just one qubit may appear as an exceedingly strong restriction; however, it is known that there exist a one-qubit attack such that $I(A : E)$ reaches the value of the optimal individual eavesdropping on the BB84 protocol [16, 11]. We shall discuss below the role of $I(B : E)$.

After this attack, Alice, Bob and Eve share a three-qubit pure state, $|\Psi_{ABE}\rangle \in \mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B \otimes \mathcal{H}_E$. Note that this state has been obtained after interacting on half of a maximally entangled state, so

$$|\Psi_{ABE}\rangle = (\mathbb{1}_A \otimes U_{BE}) \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle + |11\rangle) \otimes |E\rangle. \quad (2)$$

Eve's unitary operation acting on the qubit going to Bob and her fixed ancillary system spans a two-dimensional subspace of $\mathcal{H}_B \otimes \mathcal{H}_E$. It was shown in Ref. [16] that there exist local bases $|0'\rangle, |1'\rangle$ and $|0\rangle, |1\rangle$ for Bob and $|0\rangle, |1\rangle$ for Eve such that

$$\begin{aligned} U_{BE}|0'\rangle|E\rangle &= \sin\alpha|01\rangle + \cos\alpha|10\rangle \\ U_{BE}|1'\rangle|E\rangle &= \cos\beta|00\rangle + \sin\beta|11\rangle, \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

where $0 \leq \alpha, \beta \leq \pi/2$. Using the fact that $V \otimes V^*|\Phi^+\rangle = |\Phi^+\rangle, \forall V \in SU(2)$, we can take on Bob's space the basis in the r.h.s. of Eq. (2) to be the same as in the l.h.s. of Eq. (3). It follows that all the states (2) can be easily parametrized as

$$|\Psi_{ABE}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(\sin\alpha|001\rangle + \cos\alpha|010\rangle + \cos\beta|100\rangle + \sin\beta|111\rangle), \quad (4)$$

i.e. they are completely specified by two angles, up to local unitary transformations.

The state shared by Alice and Bob is $\rho_{AB} = \text{Tr}_E(|\Psi_{ABE}\rangle\langle\Psi_{ABE}|)$. For any two-qubit state, the maximal violation \mathcal{B} of the CHSH inequality [17] reads $\mathcal{B} = \sqrt{\lambda_1^2 + \lambda_2^2}$, where the local bound is put at one [18]. The $\lambda_{1,2}$ are the two largest (in modulus) eigenvalues of the 3×3 correlation matrix $R(\rho)$ whose elements are $(R(\rho))_{ij} = \text{Tr}(\sigma_i \otimes \sigma_j \rho)$ where $i, j = 1, 2, 3$ and σ_i denote the Pauli matrices. For the state ρ_{AB} one finds

$$R(\rho_{AB}) = \begin{pmatrix} \cos(\alpha - \beta) & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \cos(\alpha + \beta) & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & -\cos(\alpha + \beta)\cos(\alpha - \beta) \end{pmatrix}. \quad (5)$$

Note that $|R_{xx}| \geq |R_{yy}| \geq |R_{zz}|$, whence $\mathcal{B} = (R_{xx}^2 + R_{yy}^2)^{1/2}$. After some simple algebra one finds that

$$\mathcal{B} > 1 \iff 0 \leq \alpha, \beta \leq \frac{\pi}{4}, \text{ or } \frac{\pi}{4} \leq \alpha, \beta \leq \frac{\pi}{2}. \quad (6)$$

Now, let us see how the state ρ_{AB} can be used for cryptography. The honest partners measure in the local bases that are maximally correlated. That is (see Eq. (5)), Alice and Bob both measure in the x basis. Their measurement results are denoted by \pm , and the corresponding states by $|\pm\rangle = (|0\rangle \pm |1\rangle)\sqrt{2}$. Since Alice's state is completely random, $p_A(+)=p_A(-)=1/2$. Although Bob's state is different from $\mathbb{1}/2$, we also have that $p_B(+)=p_B(-)=1/2$. Then $I(A : B) = I_b(R_{xx})$ where I_b is the binary mutual entropy

$$I_b(x) = 1 + \frac{1+x}{2} \log\left(\frac{1+x}{2}\right) + \frac{1-x}{2} \log\left(\frac{1-x}{2}\right). \quad (7)$$

Note that when $0 \leq x_1, x_2 \leq 1$, $I_b(x_1) \geq I_b(x_2) \Leftrightarrow x_1 \geq x_2$.

Eve's states, depending on Alice and Bob's results, read:

$$\begin{aligned} |\tilde{e}_{++}\rangle &= \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2}} ((\cos\alpha + \cos\beta)|0\rangle + (\sin\alpha + \sin\beta)|1\rangle) \\ |\tilde{e}_{+-}\rangle &= \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2}} ((-\cos\alpha + \cos\beta)|0\rangle + (\sin\alpha - \sin\beta)|1\rangle) \\ |\tilde{e}_{-+}\rangle &= \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2}} ((\cos\alpha - \cos\beta)|0\rangle + (\sin\alpha - \sin\beta)|1\rangle) \\ |\tilde{e}_{--}\rangle &= \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2}} (-\cos\alpha + \cos\beta)|0\rangle + (\sin\alpha + \sin\beta)|1\rangle, \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

the norm of the states being the probability of any event, i.e. $p(00) = p(11) = (1+R_{xx})/4$ and $p(01) = p(10) = (1-R_{xx})/4$. In the following, the tilde denotes non-normalized states. If Eve wants to acquire information about Alice's result, she has to distinguish between the two states $\rho_i = 2(|\tilde{e}_{i+}\rangle\langle\tilde{e}_{i+}| + |\tilde{e}_{i-}\rangle\langle\tilde{e}_{i-}|)$, where $i = +, -$. In this case, the measurement maximizing her information is known (actually, it also minimizes her error probability) [19], having $I(A : E) = I_b(\sin(\alpha + \beta))$. Therefore, $I_{AB} \geq I_{AE}$ when $R_{xx} = \cos(\alpha - \beta) \geq \sin(\alpha + \beta)$, and then

$$I(A : B) > I(A : E) \iff \mathcal{B} > 1. \quad (9)$$

It is interesting to compute the information that Eve has about Bob's symbol. Using the same techniques as above for the states $\rho_i = 2(|\tilde{e}_{+i}\rangle\langle\tilde{e}_{+i}| + |\tilde{e}_{-i}\rangle\langle\tilde{e}_{-i}|)$ where $i = +, -$, one can see that $I(B : E) = I_b(\sin\alpha \cos\alpha + \sin\beta \cos\beta)$. Note that $I(A : B) > I(B : E)$ for all the values of α and β but $\beta = \pi/2 - \alpha$, where the two quantities are equal [20]. This means that the honest partners can apply a reverse reconciliation protocol, i.e. one-way error correction and privacy amplification from Bob to Alice, $\forall \alpha, \beta$, except for a set of attacks of zero measure ($\beta = \pi/2 - \alpha$). Eq. (9) can now be extended to

$$I(A : B) > \max(I(A : E), I(B : E)) \iff \mathcal{B} > 1. \quad (10)$$

The entanglement properties of ρ_{AB} also give more insight into this result, since one can see that ρ_{AB} is entangled [21] for all the attacks (except when $\beta = \pi/2 - \alpha$). Therefore none of the one-qubit attacks is able to disentangle Alice and Bob.

There is a standard way in which Eve can make her information about Alice and Bob symmetric, simply using the same one-qubit attack, $U_{BE}(\alpha, \beta)$, and adding an extra ancillary qubit. This symmetric two-qubit attack is shown in figure 1. The resulting state for Alice and Bob is Bell-diagonal [23] and has the same correlations as above, i.e. the same R matrix (although ρ_{AB} has now full rank, while above its rank was equal to 2). Therefore, the expression for the CHSH violation and the information Alice-Bob has not changed. Concerning Eve, some simple and patient algebra shows that her four two-qubit states are

$$\begin{aligned}
|\tilde{e}_{++}\rangle &= \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2}} ((\cos \alpha + \cos \beta)|0\rangle + (\sin \alpha + \sin \beta)|1\rangle) \otimes |+\rangle \\
|\tilde{e}_{+-}\rangle &= \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2}} ((-\cos \alpha + \cos \beta)|0\rangle + (\sin \alpha - \sin \beta)|1\rangle) \otimes |-\rangle \\
|\tilde{e}_{-+}\rangle &= \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2}} ((\cos \alpha - \cos \beta)|0\rangle + (\sin \alpha - \sin \beta)|1\rangle) \otimes |-\rangle \\
|\tilde{e}_{--}\rangle &= \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2}} (-(\cos \alpha + \cos \beta)|0\rangle + (\sin \alpha + \sin \beta)|1\rangle) \otimes |+\rangle, \quad (11)
\end{aligned}$$

Now, it is easy to understand the role played by the second qubit. In the first qubit we have the same information as above, so $I(A : E)$ has not changed. From the second qubit Eve knows in a deterministic way whether Alice and Bob symbol coincide. This allows her to use the knowledge on Alice's symbol for guessing Bob's, and she now has $I(B : E) = I(A : E)$. Thus, for this family of attacks

$$I(A : B) > \min(I(A : E), I(B : E)) = I(A : E) = I(B : E) \iff \mathcal{B} > 1. \quad (12)$$

Since the present attack is symmetric, it is not important which of the honest partners starts the one-way error correction and privacy amplification processes.

In conclusion: for all individual attacks with just one qubit, the link between security and BI is given by (10). For the two qubit attacks built from the one-qubit ones through the scheme of Fig. 1, the link is provided by (12). The optimal individual eavesdropping on the BB84 protocol belongs to this family of two-qubit attacks [7]. But we would like to stress here that our results are independent of any considered protocol. Indeed, we have studied the relation between Bell violation and security for a family of states obtained after eavesdropping on half of a maximally two-qubit entangled state. We have shown that the violation of the CHSH guarantees the existence of projective measurements whose results allow the honest partners to establish a key with efficiency [24]. As expected, these measurements are related to the bases that appear in the violated CHSH inequality.




Figure 1: General scheme for modifying the initial one-qubit attack, specified by $U_{BE}(\alpha, \beta)$, where $I(A : B) \geq I(B : E)$ and $I(A : E) \geq I(B : E)$, into a symmetric two-qubit attack, where $I(A : E)$ is the same but now $I(B : E) = I(A : E)$.

4 Conclusions

We have discussed the main connections between Bell’s inequalities and the usefulness of entanglement in quantum information processing. In all the cases that have been considered, a state that violates a Bell’s inequality is useful for quantum information processing; in the case of cryptography, it even leads to efficient (one-way) secret-key extraction. Bell’s inequalities appear as detectors of “efficient entanglement”.

The precise link between entanglement, “useful” or “efficient” entanglement, and non-locality remains however elusive, in spite of all these clarifications. On the one hand, we are just now beginning to tackle in a fruitful way the hard task of classifying all the Bell’s inequalities [25]. On the other hand, our understanding of entanglement has been recently improved by a remarkable result [26] by the Horodeckis and Oppenheim, who have shown that a secret key can be extracted from some bound entangled states: ultimately, we may discover that any form of entanglement is “useful” for something. This situation promises still a lot of work to do for the future.

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- [20] This point was missed in the introductory paragraphs of Refs. [11]. The mistake is found in eq. (5) of the Phys. Rev. A paper: D_{BE} should read $\frac{1}{2}(1 - \frac{1}{2} \sin 2\phi)$. Fig.1 of both papers suffer of this mistake: actually, for the one-qubit attack studied there, $\min(I_{AE}, I_{BE}) = I_{BE}$, which is in turn always smaller than I_{AB} . The main results of these papers, concerning multi-partners cryptography (where it is not even clear how “reverse reconciliation” should be defined) are not invalidated; nor is the message of the introduction, since, as we are going to show, the symmetry $I_{AE} = I_{BE}$ is recovered by giving Eve a second qubit.
- [21] Since ρ_{AB} is a two-qubit state, its entanglement can be detected by the non-positivity of the partial transposition, $\rho_{AB}^{T_A}$. The partial transposition, that was introduced in Ref. [22], is defined as follows: consider an operator, X , that acts on $\mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B$, where d_A and d_B denote the dimension of each space. The partial trasposition of X with respect to the first subsystem, in the basis $\{|1\rangle, \dots, |d_A\rangle\}$, is given by $X^{T_A} \equiv \sum_{i,j=1}^{d_A} \sum_{k,l=1}^{d_B} \langle ik|O|jl\rangle|jk\rangle\langle il|$.
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- [24] Alice and Bob obtain the secret key by measuring always in the x basis. However, Eve cannot pass unnoticed by using an intecept-resend strategy, because under such an attack the CHSH inequality ceases to be violated. In practice, Alice and Bob should (seldom but randomly) modify their measurement, in order to check the violation of CHSH in a subsequent sifting procedure. If the quantum channel allowed the violation, then they can extract a secure key; otherwise, they abort the protocol.
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